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Abstract 
The house price in Hong Kong is well-known to be "unaffordable." This paper relates the 
macroeconomy and the housing market of Hong Kong and argues that the housing supply plays 
a vital role in explaining the phenomenon. This paper also shows that there are some practical 
challenges in understanding the housing supply of Hong Kong, including the potentially 
complicated ownership structure of real estate development. While the discussion centers on 
the situation of Hong Kong, its lesson may also apply to the housing markets in other small 
open economies. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper attempts to enrich our understanding of housing supply, based on 
our preliminary analysis of the Hong Kong data. According to the conventional wisdom 
of economics, when the demand for some goods increases, the price would increase as 
long as the supply is not perfectly elastic. The supply, however, would catch up later, 
bringing the price down. The Hong Kong housing market seems to at odds with 
conventional wisdom. While the housing price in Hong Kong has stayed expensive for 
some years (Demographia, 2019), the housing supply does not increase proportionally. 
In fact, according to Kwan et al. (2015), Leung and Tang (2015), among others, the 
ratio of new housing supply to the existing stock of housing virtually stays constant 
after Hong Kong returns to China. Thus, one would wonder why the housing supply 
does not increase. While the case of Hong Kong is extreme, several cities in the world 
face a similar problem (Demographia, 2019). Unfortunately, existing housing market 
research concentrate on the demand side. DiPasquale (1999, p.9~11) summarizes the 
earlier literature this way, "Virtually every paper written on housing supply begins with 
some version of the same sentence: while there is an extensive literature on the demand 
for housing, far less has been written about housing supply... Second, housing supply 
is the outcome of complicated decision making by builders and the owners of existing 
housing… In the case of new supply, there is no standard data set that permits us to 
observe the behavior of builders of new housing…" While there are changes since then, 
the majority of housing market research is still on the demand side. It is partly because 
most real estate developers in North America are private firms and hence information 
disclosure is conducted voluntarily.  
Despite such difficulties, some authors have made important contributions to 
our understanding of the housing supply.1 For instance, Somerville (1999) observes that 
“National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB) surveys indicate that between 1985 
and 1992 the 50 largest U.S. builders had less than a 10% share of total national single 
family starts. Because most builders construct units in a single market, national 
measures are unlikely to show any evidence of concentration. The story is quite 
different if we look at individual MSA housing markets. Among the 40 MSA markets 
surveyed by the NAHB…, the share of 1992 single-family closing belonging to the 
                                                            
1 In this paper, we focus on the empirical research on housing market. There are theoretical attempts to 
understand the housing supply. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review that literature. Among 
others, see Wang and Zhou (2006), and the reference therein. 
largest four builders in a MSA (equivalent to a four-firm concentration ratio) ranged 
from a low of 4.2% in Boston, MA to a high of 43.9% in San Diego, CA. These 
metropolitan area statistics are at odds with the perfect-competition paradigm.” 
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996), Green and Malpezzi (2003), among others, compare 
the difference between national versus city level housing markets. Green et al. (2005) 
show that the city-level housing supply elasticities vary significantly across different 
MSA. Saiz (2010) find that while nature and geography play some role in those 
difference of city-level housing supply elasticities, policy decisions seem to magnify 
the cross-city differences. Leung et al. (2011) provide clear evidence that both the city-
level housing demand and housing supply functions are very different even among the 
major cities in China. 2  All these studies point to the direction that the level of 
aggregation matters for our understanding of the housing supply.3  
Based on all these contributions, this paper focuses on the housing market of 
Hong Kong, paying particular attention to the apparent inelastic housing supply. The 
structure of this paper, therefore, is straightforward. The next section provides a simple 
overview of the Hong Kong market. Then we examine the Hong Kong housing supply 
through a series of examples. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Hong Kong Housing Market and the Macroeconomy 
 
It is well known that the housing market and the macroeconomy are closely 
related (Leung, 2004, 2017; Leung and Chen, 2017; Leung and Ng, forthcoming). Thus, 
to explain how the Hong Kong housing market operates as a whole, it is necessary to 
present some basic stylized facts of the Hong Kong macroeconomy along the way. We 
mainly employ data from official sources.4 Figure 1 shows that the population, the life 
expectancy, and the per capita GDP (in real terms) all increase over time in Hong Kong. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the housing demand will increase over time 
and if the housing supply does not increase proportionally, the house price could only 
increase in equilibrium. And that is indeed the case of Hong Kong. Figure 2a displays 
two lines in one graph. The solid line (which uses the left-hand scale) is the ratio of new 
                                                            
2 See also Huang et al. (2015), Wu et al. (2012, 2016) for more discussion on the city-level Chinese 
housing markets. 
3 For more general discussion of aggregation bias, see Hanushek et al. (1996), among others. 
4 The website of the Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong SAR Government is 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/home/  
housing supply relative to the existing stock. It clearly decreases over time from over 
5% in 1985, reaching its bottom in 2009, and always stays below 2% till the end of our 
sampling period. The dotted line is the Hong Kong housing price in real terms. It 
reaches one peak in 1997, and then declines as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) hits 
Hong Kong. It starts to rebound after the Chinese government declares “individual 
travel,” which allows Chinese citizens in selected cities to visit Hong Kong as 
individuals. At the same time, more Chinese students come to Hong Kong to study. All 
these policies stimulate the demand for Hong Kong housing and the real house price 
reaches a new peak, which is well above the pre-AFC one (Chong and Yiu, 2019; Leung 
and Tang, 2012, 2015).   
 
(Figure 1, 2a about here) 
Many explanations have been proposed to explain why the Hong Kong new 
housing supply does not increase even when the house price (in real terms) increase so 
much for so many years. First, there may be some "market distortions" issues. Notice 
the Hong Kong government provides a large amount of public rental buildings, which 
shelters about one-third of the total population. Since the rental rates of these 
government housing are typically below the market rate and also adjust slower than the 
market rate, these public rental units are over-subscribed, and the queue for those units 
only extends over time. Since the private real estate developers cannot compete with 
these subsidized units, they may, therefore, be discouraged to provide low-tier housing 
and turn to provide the medium and high-tier housing units (Wong, 1998, Chow et al., 
2002). 
Moreover, land ownership in Hong Kong is public. Unlike the private real estate 
developers in the United States who can acquire land from farmers, real estate 
developers may need to wait for the Hong Kong government to sell the right of usage. 
Figure 2b shows that the share of residential land is somehow bounded at 7% of the 
total in Hong Kong, while the population continues to increase throughout the sampling 
period. Notice further that, unlike many cities in the world, the boundary of Hong Kong 
has been fixed by the Basic Laws and hence it is difficult for Hong Kong to expand 
geographically. Therefore, the limited land supply explanation is sensible. However, 
this explanation may not be sufficient to explain the irresponsive new housing supply 
in Hong Kong, because the Hong Kong government does improve the land auction 
system.  
For instance, in response to the weak housing market after the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC), the government adopted an “application list system” in 1999.5 It is a 
market-oriented mechanism where the developers could propose a price for purchasing 
a site that interests them. When it is above 80% of the assessed Open Market Value 
from the government, the application will be accepted, and an open land auction will 
then be initiated. However, if the highest bidding price in the auction does not exceed 
or reach the un-disclosed reservation price, the land will not be sold. Such design allows 
real estate developers to take the initiative for acquiring the area from the government 
and the new housing supply can become more responsive to the market. 
Nevertheless, the application list system has two loopholes. First, the un-
disclosed reservation price induces information asymmetry between developers and 
government, in which the developers find difficulties in proposing a reasonable land 
purchasing price to the government for consideration, and thus it may not be effective 
in increasing the land supply under different market conditions. Second, the mechanism 
allows the land supply to be controlled by large oligopolistic developers, while the 
government can only take a passive role. On February 28, 2013, the Development 
Bureau announced that the Application List System was abolished, and the government 
will take a leading role in putting up sites for sale.6 Also, the Task Force on Land Supply 
was established in September 2017, with primary focuses on the current land shortage 
and forecasting land demand and supply in the next 30 years. It facilitates the 
discussions in the community and attempts to narrow the differences among 
stakeholders. Based on public engagement exercise, it also provides a clear blueprint to 
the government regarding increasing land supply.7 
 
(Figure 2b about here) 
The third explanation is that due to the scarcity of residential land in Hong Kong, 
developers would mostly build high-rise buildings. Many newly built condominium 
buildings have more than 30 stories. Thus, developing housing units at this scale 
introduces an implicit entry barrier for small-size and in-experienced real estate 
developers to enter the market. The new housing supply may, therefore, deviate from 
                                                            
5 For more details, please refer: 
https://www.devb.gov.hk/filemanager/en/content_69/press20080222_appendix2.pdf 
6 The press release can be found at 
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201302/28/P201302280598.htm 
7 The full report can be downloaded at https://www.landforhongkong.hk/pdf/Report%20(Eng).pdf 
the level that would be implied by the perfectly competitive paradigm. Unfortunately, 
most of the existing studies presume a perfectly competitive market for new housing 
supply (Leung and Wang, 2007; Leung and Wong, 2004; Leung et al., 2011). Therefore, 
to understand the new housing supply, we may need to keep an open mind about the 
market structure. 
One merit of the Hong Kong market is that the major developers are all listed 
companies. Therefore, we can take advantage of the information disclosure of these 
public companies. In particular, the attributable gross floor area is provided by all listed 
real estate developers. We can also obtain the total attributable gross floor area from 
the official source. Hence, we can efficiently compute the share of the listed developers 
in the market. Figure 3a shows clearly that most residential housing areas are provided 
by the listed developers. The finance literature has educated us that listed firms are 
typically much more substantial than unlisted counterparts. Hence, Figure 3 suggests 
that the market for new housing units is dominated by large developers. 
 
(Table 1, Figure 3 about here) 
However, the fact that large listed developers develop most of the new housing 
units does not necessarily imply that those developers have much market power in the 
market of new housing units. Theoretically, it is possible that among the significant 
developers, there is intense competition and hence although a finite number of suppliers 
dominates the market, the market equilibrium price is still approximately close to the 
(ideal) perfectly competitive equilibrium counterpart. 8  Another possibility follows 
from the contestable market theory that there are always some non-local developers that 
are ready to enter the market.9 The incumbents, therefore, would not charge a price 
level that significantly deviates from the marginal cost, leading the markup in 
equilibrium being small or even zero. In the current context, both the average cost and 
marginal cost are not directly observed, making it difficult to test these hypotheses 
directly. 
Table 1 tabulates the listed developers, and the Urban Renewal Authority, 
                                                            
8 For more discussion, see Tirole (1988), among others. 
9 The contestable market theory can be traced back to Baumol et al. (1982). It quickly becomes very 
controversial, both theoretically and empirically. Among others, see Baumol and Willig (1986), 
Brander and Zhang (1990), Martin (1989), Morrison and Clifford (1987), Spence (1983), and the 
reference therein. This paper has no intention to take a side in this debate. It merely mentions such a 
theoretical possibility. 
which also participate actively in providing new housing units. It is a long list and hence 
to establish the case that the market of new housing units significantly deviates from 
the perfectly competitive ideal, we need to measure the degree of market concentration 
formally. In Hong Kong, listed real estate developers only provide information about 
the total area of residential property they complete in each period. Therefore, we will 
measure the “market share” in the market of new housing supply by the amount of area 
of residential property each developer completes as a percentage of the total amount of 
area all developers complete during the same period. 10  Following the industrial 
organization (IO) literature, we adopt the Herfindahl Index (HI), which is bounded 
between zero and unity. 11  The higher the value of HI, the higher the market 
concentration is. HI attains the value of unity if the market is occupied by a monopoly. 
Constrained by the data availability, we can only provide quarterly HI. Figure 3b shows 
that there are indeed periods when the market is very concentrated, such as the period 
between 2007 to 2011, which roughly coincides the period of the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC).12 While a simple plot of HI is not enough to sustain the claim that the 
market of a new housing unit is oligopolistic, it seems reasonable to further investigate 
such a possibility in future research.13 
 
3. The Empirical Challenges of Studying the Market of New 
Housing Units in Hong Kong 
 
In this section, we illustrate some practical challenges in studying the market of 
new housing supply in Hong Kong. The first challenge is the potentially complicated 
ownership structure of the development. First, it is well-known that the major 
developers in Hong Kong are all family business. Some researches indicate that family 
business in Hong Kong may moderate the monitoring function of the board and may be 
                                                            
10 The market capitalization of each listed developer has been suggested to us as an alternative 
measure. In the context of Hong Kong, it may not be a desirable empirical strategy. We will return to 
this point later. 
11 Formally, ܪܫ ൌ ∑ ሺݏ௜ሻଶ௡௜ୀଵ  , where ݏ௜ is the market share of the ݅௧௛ developer. Since 0 ൑ ݏ௜ ൑ 1, it 
can be proved that 0 ൑ ܪܫ ൑ 1. 
12 Most studies date the GFC with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers. However, some studies 
demonstrate empirically that the U.S. housing market started the downturn in 2016. See Chang et al. 
(2015, Appendix I), among others, for a review of the literature. 
13 It is a difficult job to formally establish the degree of competition in a market without a structural 
model. For instance, see Brander and Zhang (1990) for more discussion.  
associated with bad corporate governance and potentially inferior performance 
(Cheung et al., 2010, Jaggi et al., 2009, Lee and Barnes, 2017).  
In the context of the new housing supply, Figure 4a shows that only a tiny share 
of real estate projects is completed by MTR (where the government owns around 75% 
of the Company) or Urban Renewal Authority (a quasi-governmental body), and the 
rest is built by the private sector. There are many possible arrangements for the private 
sector to complete a project. Unlike the textbook case, a real estate development may 
be jointly developed by a large, listed developer with some non-listed companies, which 
are daughter companies of other listed developer, or even the collaborated developer.14 
We also find cases where listed developers would jointly develop a project through the 
creation of a non-listed company. There may be good economic reasons behind such 
arrangements, including internal monitoring, risk-sharing, etc. 15  Since those 
arrangements have been studied extensively in the literature, we only present the facts 
in this paper. And throughout this paper, we treat all the new units directly developed 
by the mother company or her subsidiaries as the same.  
We now present some real cases. In Figure 4b, two daughter companies of Sun 
Hung Kai, which is a listed developer, jointly develop a development. Notice that in 
this case, Sun Hung Kai does not involve directly. Figure 4c presents the case where 
the Citic Pacific and HKR International limited have an equal share in a company, 
which in turn solely develop Discovery Bay.    
Figure 4d and 4e provide some representative cases of Hong Kong. In Hong 
Kong, the railway was under the management of a company named KCRC and the 
subway was under the supervision of another company named MTR. The two 
companies then "merge" under the government command and both the railway and 
subway are now under the management of MTR. Since the building and maintenance 
of railway and subway are costly and yet the fares are subject to severe regulations, the 
government often provides a piece of land near the station, or the right of development 
on top of a station, to "compensate" MTR. Figure 4d presents the case where the KCRC 
and a subsidiary of Sino Land, which is a listed developer to jointly develop Palazzo, 
which is near one of the train stations.  Figure 4e presents a case where MTR and a 
                                                            
14 Throughout the paper, “daughter company” will be used interchangeably with “subsidiary.”  
15 For instance, see Williamson (1975, 1996), among others. 
subsidiary of New World Development, which is a listed developer, and jointly develop 
a project near another station. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 
The second challenge is that the primary developers do not only operate in the 
local market but also China or other places. Hence, the fluctuations of their revenues 
and profits could be de-coupled from the local housing market. Figure 5 shows the 
geographical composition of revenues of the major developers. It is clear that except 
Sun Hung Kai, all are somehow “geographically diversified” in the sense that the 
income from Hong Kong (including housing units sale and other revenue) constitutes 
no more than two-thirds of their total revenues. In the case of Cheung Kong, the income 
from Hong Kong is about 40% of the total.  Hence, the market capitalization of a real 
estate developer may reflect not only the anticipated profit from the local market but 
also that from the overseas markets. Therefore, it may not be an excellent empirical 
strategy to use the market capitalization to measure the domestic market share of the 
listed developers in Hong Kong. 
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
Thus, combining the geographical diversification and the potentially 
complicated ownership structure of different real estate development projects that we 
discussed earlier, it follows that the firm-level profit rate and the leverage ratio may not 
be very informative about the sale of their new housing units. Our experience is that the 
empirical challenges can be overcome with hard work. We just need to proceed with 
extra cautions when we analyze these listed real estate developers. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
It is well-known that for small open economies like Hong Kong or Singapore, 
the domestic house price movements would be affected by the global economic 
environment, including the fluctuations of the U.S. interest rate and stock market 
(Chang et al., 2012, 2013, Kwan et al., 2015). By its very nature as durable goods, the 
total stock of housing adjusts sluggishly. Therefore, it is not surprising that much 
research efforts have been devoted to the housing demand, especially in the case of 
small open economies. On the other hand, complete ignorance of the housing supply 
would not deliver us the full picture of the housing market dynamics. This paper focuses 
on the housing supply in Hong Kong. It provides an overview of the relationship 
between the macroeconomy and the housing market in Hong Kong. It also explains the 
empirical challenges that we need to overcome to fully understand the housing supply 
in Hong Kong. We believe that while the efforts of this paper concentrate on Hong 
Kong, the lessons can apply to other cities. We are therefore very optimistic about the 
future of housing supply research.  
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1a: Hong Kong Population and Life Expectancy is increasing over time 
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Figure 2b: Share of land used for residential purpose and population 
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Figure 4c: Citic Pacific and HKR International Ltd. Jointly develop Discovery Bay 
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Figure 4d: KCRC and a subsidiary of Sino Land jointly develop Palazzo 
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Figure 4e: MTR jointly develop Riverpark with a subsidiary of New World Development  
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Figure 5a: Geographical revenue decomposition of Cheung Kong Holdings 
 
 
 
Figure 5b: Geographical revenue decomposition of New World Development 
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Figure 5c: Geographical revenue decomposition of Sun Hung Kai Properties 
 
 
 
Figure 5d: Geographical revenue decomposition of Henderson Land Development 
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Table 1: List of major developers 
Property Developers Abbreviations Stock Code 
Asia Standard International ASI 129 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited / CK Asset 
Holdings Limited CKH 0001 /1113 
China Overseas Land and Investment Ltd. COL 688 
China Resources CR 291 
Chinese Estates Holdings Limited CEH 127 
Chuang’s Consortium International Ltd. CCI 367 
CITIC CITIC 267 
Emperor International EMP 163 
Hang Lung Group HLG 10 
Hang Lung Properties Limited  HL 101 
Henderson Land Development Co Ltd  HEN 12 
Hong Kong Ferry (Holdings) Co Ltd HKF 50 
Hong Kong International Limited HKR 480 
Hopewell Holdings Limited  HOPE 54 
Hutchison Whampoa Property  HUT 13 
Hysan Development Company Limited  HYS 14 
K. Wah International KW 173 
Kerry Properties Limited  KP 683 
Kowloon Development Company Limited KDC 34 
Lai Sun Development LSD 488 
MTR Corporation MTR 66 
New World China Land Limited NWCL 917 
New World Development  NWD 17 
PCCW PCCW 8 
SEA Holdings SEA 251 
Shun Tak Holdings Limited STH 242 
Sino Land  SINO 83 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited  SHK 16 
Swire Pacific A SW 19 
Tai Cheung Holdings Limited TCH 88 
Tai Sang Land Development TSLD 89 
Urban Renewal Authority  URA --- 
Wharf Holdings Limited  WH 4 
Wheelock Properties  WHEEL 20 
Y. T. Realty YTR 75 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Profit rate of developers 
 
 
Figure A2: Leverage ratio of developers 
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